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Justice, understood as a societal ideal, lies at the heart of political struggles, landmark trials, and normative philosophies. Two seemingly opposing figures embody two powerful visions of what justice is—or should be: Jacques Vergès, the advocate of rupture, and John Rawls, the liberal theorist of fairness. One defended reviled or revolutionary figures by invoking moral legitimacy over legality; the other proposed a universal theory of justice grounded in social contract and the “veil of ignorance.” Reconciling these two approaches reveals both the tensions and the mutual contributions between formal justice, political justice, and historical memory.
I. Jacques Vergès and the Defense of Rupture: A Philosophy of Subversion
Jacques Vergès never claimed value neutrality. From his earliest cases—particularly defending FLN (Algerian National Liberation Front) militants in the 1950s—he pioneered a radical legal strategy he called the “defense of rupture.” This approach no longer sought leniency or denied the facts but rather questioned the very legitimacy of the court, turning the trial into a political platform and reflecting the moral responsibility of the accuser.
A landmark example: the 1957 trial of Djamila Bouhired. Accused of planting bombs, the FLN militant was defended by Vergès not by denying her actions, but by questioning the colonial regime’s right to judge her. The courtroom was transformed into a stage where colonial violence was exposed. This method was later applied to the trials of Klaus Barbie, Carlos the Jackal, and Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan—transforming justice into a political battleground.
Vergès rejected the supposed universality of Western legal norms, defending instead a justice of memory, resistance, and power struggles. As he once put it: "I don’t defend monsters; I defend symbols."
II. John Rawls: A Normative Theory of Justice as Fairness
In stark contrast to Vergès’ courtroom theater, American philosopher John Rawls proposed in A Theory of Justice (1971) a rational, moral construction of justice. His method is built around a thought experiment: imagine the rules of society being decided behind a “veil of ignorance,” where no one knows their future social position. This ensures impartiality and leads to two key principles:
Principle of equal liberties: Each individual has an equal right to basic liberties.
Difference principle: Inequalities are only acceptable if they benefit the least advantaged.
Rawls' vision favors institutional stability and moral acceptability by rational individuals. His theory presumes a democratic framework where public debate is free and inclusive—precisely the type of context that Vergès rejects when dealing with colonial or authoritarian regimes.
III. Two Visions of Justice: Can They Be Reconciled?
At first glance, Rawls and Vergès seem irreconcilable. One envisions institutional equity within a democratic society; the other dismantles the institution itself when it's rooted in oppression. Yet they share a key concern: justice as recognition of human dignity.
In contexts where justice is corrupted—such as colonial systems—Vergès’ strategy of rupture can be seen as a way to restore Rawlsian justice by extralegal means. In this sense, the rupture serves as a radical reminder that there can be no fairness without the inclusion of the excluded.
Thus, Vergès may be understood as a corrective agent in systems of structural injustice—echoing Rawls’ own arguments for civil disobedience in the face of unjust regimes.
IV. In France: A Beneficial Shockwave
In France, the impact of Vergès’ strategy was twofold. On the one hand, it forced the justice system to confront its colonial past. The 1987 trial of Klaus Barbie served as a national reckoning, exposing historical truths about torture and deportation during WWII.
On the other hand, the rise of the “rupture defense” redefined the political role of the defense attorney. No longer a mere legal technician, the lawyer became a historical actor capable of questioning the very legitimacy of the legal system.
In the long run, France benefited from a more open legal culture, more receptive to critiques of the justice system and enriched by high-profile, politically charged trials that helped foster collective memory.
V. In Algeria: From Rupture to Lawlessness?
In Algeria, the legacy of rupture is more ambiguous. The FLN’s strategy, championed by Vergès, successfully turned the colonizer’s tools against itself. But the radicalism that was justified during the liberation struggle was institutionalized after independence into a regime where the rule of law never fully took root.
The post-1962 Algerian state retained a deep mistrust of an independent judiciary. The revolutionary legitimacy of the FLN—including summary trials, torture, and political violence—instilled a culture of impunity. Claiming to embody revolutionary justice, the regime often suspended fundamental rights.
Where Rawls would have insisted on building fair and stable institutions, Algeria experienced a confiscation of popular sovereignty by a post-revolutionary elite that used historical legitimacy as an excuse to curtail civil liberties.
A revealing anecdote: during the 1990s civil war, lawyers who attempted to defend human rights using similar tools to Vergès were themselves accused of betrayal. What was once a tool of emancipation had become a means of repression.
VI. Conclusion: A Double-Edged Legacy
Jacques Vergès’ philosophy reminds us that all justice is political, especially when it claims to be neutral in oppressive contexts. John Rawls offers a moral compass for reconciling individual liberties and collective fairness. The former disrupts institutions; the latter builds them.
The histories of France and Algeria show that rupture can push justice forward—as long as it does not become an end in itself. When rupture becomes the norm, chaos follows. When order reigns without justice, revolt becomes inevitable.
Reconciliation of both approaches requires a transition from rupture to reconstruction: embracing radical critique as a springboard for more just institutions—not as a permanent state.justes, non comme une fin en soi.
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